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Abstract—In the wake of the success of peer-to-peer network-
ing, privacy has arisen as a big concern. Even though steps have
been taken in order to attain an anonymous communications
channel, all approaches consider the overlay network as a single
entity and none of them take into account peer group based
environments. In this paper, we describe a method in order
to maintain unlinkability in group membership authentication
attempts when using peer groups relying on web-of-trust. Using
this method, it is not possible to ultimately pinpoint a peer’s
identity despite the constraints of a group membership scenario.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The adoption of peer-to-peer (P2P) technologies has become
a promising solution to share distributed resources. Usually,
P2P environments are conceptualized as a global overlay
network without any kind of logical segmentation as far
as resource availability is concerned. However, under some
circumstances, it is desirable to segment the network into sets
of peers which share common interest or services, creating
peer groups. The main reasons for such segmentation range
from restricting access to some resources to creating a scoping
domain.
A lot of research efforts in the field of P2P have mainly
focused towards strictly functionality issues such as scalability,
efficient message propagation across the network or access to
distributed resources. At present time, the maturity of P2P
research field has pushed through new problems such as those
related with security.
One of the desired security properties for a P2P system
is anonymity, allowing users to connect to the P2P network
without exposing their identity, protecting their privacy and
escaping censorship. Initiatives such as Freenet [1], FreeHaven
[2] or Tor [3] provide mechanisms to deploy fully anonymous
P2P networks. In such systems, it is not possible to easily
guess the source of messages transmitted across the network.
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A general survey on anonymity in P2P systems may also be
found in [4].
Unfortunately, the aforementioned initiatives do not take
into account peer group based environments. These proposals
rely on the assumption of a flat network where peers do not
form groups, and then anonymity is focused on messaging,
resource access and publication. However, as we already
mention, network segmentation in different groups could be
useful in some applications but it would be interesting to still
preserve user anonymity. That means it will be necessary to
identify which peers are group members, without disclosing
its identity or being able to trace peer interactions. In such
scenario, an additional mechanism for anonymously proving
peer group membership is necessary.
The goal and main contribution of this paper is to provide
some degree of anonymity to peer groups, allowing peers to
prove membership to each other without disclosing their actual
identity. Specifically, the proposed method is concerned with
identity unlinkability: even though members of a peer group
may know the identity of its current members, it is not possible
to trace authentication attempts to a specific identity or tell
which have been initiated by the same peer. This is achieved
with the help of ring signatures [5], [6]. Our proposal is based
on a web-of-trust scenario [7], since such models heavily take
into account peer equality and decentralization. Such features
are important regarding the anonymity problem, since on one
hand they avoid that a single peer becomes too powerful and is
able to compromise the rest of the group member’s anonymity,
and on the other hand each member manages its own data.
The proposal assumes that peers are already provided with
anonymous transport, having the capability to anonymously
exchange messages at a lower layer using any of the initiatives
that already exist, such as [1], [2], [3]. Otherwise, the point of
anonymously proving peer group membership becomes moot
as the source peer identifier is sent across the network in plain
text.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II, briefly
describes how group membership access control is usually
attained in a peer group and the challenges it poses when
applied to an anonymous environment. Following, section
III provides an overview of ring signature scheme. Section
IV presents how unlinkability may be attained despite the
constraints of a peer group environment. Finally, section V
summarizes the paper contributions and outlines further work.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we review the related work regarding peer
group membership mechanisms and the existing proposals
regarding peer anonymity.
Peer group membership approaches have been discussed in
the scientific literature, although not always have been referred
with the same name or taken into account the characteristics
of a P2P environment.
The most basic approaches use a symmetric key model
similar to that of ad hoc networks [8], [9]. This is an obvious
solution for peer group access control, as proof of membership
is achieved via the direct usage of this token. However, its
main drawbacks are key management and distribution. The
shared key must be transmitted to new members of the group
via an out-of-band secure channel and changing such key is
equivalent to recreating the group from scratch.
Current group membership approaches mainly focus on
asymmetric cryptography. Every peer generates its own public-
private key pair, which is used in order to authenticate to
other peers. Most of such approaches [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14] rely on a Certification Authority (CA) which generates
certificates to group members, binding their public key to their
identity. Those certificates may be used as proof of peer group
membership, providing simplicity to peer group management,
as a single trusted entity takes care of everything. However, the
distributed nature of P2P networks tends to avoid relying on
a fully centralized CA, using instead threshold cryptography
to split the CA’s private key between different peers [15].
A different approach, specially suited to P2P, is to rely
on a web-of-trust instead of a single entity, such as a CA.
This approach also prevents a single peer from becoming
the only group manager by making use of the system’s self-
organization and enforcing peer equality. A proposal specifi-
cally based on group membership, though not anonymously,
is presented in [16], [17]. All peers act as a fully functional
CA, vouching for other peers group membership by signing
certificates to them. Any peer Pi vouching for some other peer
Pj’s membership, is considered as its patron. Peers test group
membership by finding trust paths (or certificate paths) [18].
A trust path is a chain of multiple certificates which validates
some subject’s public key, starting from the validating entity
and ending in the subject to be validated.
Peer group membership approaches with the specific goal
to maintain anonymity exist [19], [20]. Unfortunately, these
approaches are entirely based on a centralized model, rather
than a P2P architecture, where a single entity controls group
membership.
Another recent proposal [21] takes into account the id-
iosyncrasies of peer group scenarios. However, its main goal
is maintaining linkability in such a way that it is possible
to identify that different authentication attempts have been
performed by the same peer, which is just the opposite of
our goal.
The problem of anonymous proof of peer group membership
is also very similar to that of generic anonymous authentica-
tion [22], [23] and anonymous identification in ad hoc envi-
ronments [24], [25]. However, there’s a significant difference
in our base scenario. In the cited proposals, group formation
is made within the context of a user population where either a
single entity generates some common knowledge to be shared
within the group (equivalent to a symmetric key approach), or
a flat membership hierarchy exists (as it is the case in a CA
approach). In contrast, our work approaches a web-of-trust
based environment, where each peer is fully autonomous and
trust relationships without a single root entity must be taken
into account.
III. RING SIGNATURES
The notion of a ring signature scheme [5] is related to that
of group signature [26]. In the latter, a trusted group manager
predefines certain groups of users and distributes special
keys to their members. Each member can use these keys to
anonymously generate signatures which look indistinguishable
to other group members. In contrast, the former does not need
a group manager. This is a highly desirable feature in a self-
organized environment such as P2P.
Ring signatures are useful when the members are au-
tonomous and do not want to rely on other peers. They are
signer-ambiguous and provide no way to revoke the anonymity
of the actual signer. It is only necessary to assume that each
peer group member already holds a private/public key pair of
some standard signature scheme. A ring signature is generated
by the actual signer declaring an arbitrary set of possible
signers, which includes himself, and computing the signature
by himself using only his private key and the others’ public
keys.
In this scheme, the set of possible signers is called a ring.
The ring member who produces the actual signature is the
signer and each of the other ring members is a non-signer.
The signer does not need the consent or assistance of the other
ring members to put them in the ring, only knowledge of their
public keys is needed. Two procedures are defined:
• σ = ring − sign(m,PK1, PK2, ..., PKn, SKi) pro-
duces a ring signature σ for the message m, given the
public keys PK1, PK2, ..., PKn of the n ring members,
together with the private key SKi of the i-th member, the
actual signer, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
• ring−verify(m,σ) accepts a message m and a signature
σ and outputs either true or false. σ includes the public
keys of all possible signers (PK1, PK2, ..., PKn).
Verification satisfies the usual soundness and completeness
conditions, but since ring signatures are signer-ambiguous, the
verifier is unable to determine the identity of the actual signer:
in a ring of size n, probability is not greater than 1/n. This
limited anonymity is unconditional [5], since even an infinitely
powerful adversary cannot link signatures to the same signer.
Ring signatures are also particularly efficient, since generat-
ing or verifying a ring signature costs the same as generating
or verifying a regular signature plus an extra multiplication or
two for each non-signer. This means that the scheme is still
useful even when the ring cardinality is very high.
IV. AUTHENTICATION UNLINKABILITY WITH RING
SIGNATURES
The following notation will be used in this section.
• PKi: Peer Pi’s public key.
• SKi: Peer Pi’s secret (private) key.
• Certi: One of peer Pi’s certificates, containing PKi. It
must be noted that in a web-of-trust, Pi may hold several
certificates (obtained from different patrons). However,
they all always contain PKi.
• EPKi(x): A string x encrypted using the public key of
peer Pi.
Group access control using asymmetric cryptography by
means of digital certificates, is normally performed through
trust paths. When some peer Pn wants to prove to some
other peer P1 that he is part of the group (P1 authenticates
Pn), all certificates conforming a trust path between Pn
and P1 are transmitted. A trust path from peer P1 to peer
Pn is a list of certificates (Cert1, Cert2, Cert3, ..., Certn),
where P1 signed Cert2, P2 signed Cert3, etc. up to Certn.
Consequently, Pn may be considered a group member by P1
only if such trust path exists.
However, using this approach, the public key PKn becomes
the main constraint in order to achieve unlinkability between
authentication attempts. Even in the case that Certn does not
contain any information regarding Pn’s identity, the public key
can be regarded as a unique identifier or pseudonym and only
some degree of pseudonymity is ultimately achieved.
In order to solve this problem, we introduce the concept
of trust tree, TT between two peers, which will be used as a
means for authentication instead of a trust path, in order to
solve this issue.
A trust tree between peers Pi and Pj , TT ij , is defined as a set
of certificates {Cert1, Cert2, · · · , Certn} with the following
properties:
• ∃i ∈ {1, · · · , n} such that Certi is Pi’s certificate.
• ∃j ∈ {1, · · · , n} with j 6= i such that Certj is Pj’s
certificate.
• ∀k ∈ {1, · · · , n} there exists a trust path from Certi to
Certk. As a result, it is guaranteed that a trust path exists
from Certi to Certj .
The certificate of Pj in TT ij is unknown to anybody but
its creator: Pj . It is only guaranteed that PKj is in some
certificate within TT ij . Also note that, in contrast with trust
paths, Certj doesn’t need to be the edge one, it may be anyone
within TT ij . As a result, given a peer group, more than one
possible TT ji may exist between two peers.
TT ij can be envisioned as a certificate hierarchy which
comprises several trust paths, as shows the example in figure
1.
Since TT ij is a set of certificates, it contains the set of public
keys PKTT ij = PK1, · · · , PKi, · · · , PKj , · · · , PKn. As a
result, it is feasible to apply a ring signature scheme where Pj
Fig. 1. Trust Path and possible Trust Tree between peer Pi and Pj
may specify the TT ij as the set of possible signers. Choosing
a ring signature scheme is worthwile in a P2P environment as
shown in section III.
A. Authentication process
In order for Pj to anonymously proof group membership
to Pi, a valid TT ij must be generated by Pj in advance. The
authentication process then follows, as shown in figure 2.
1) A session identifier, sid, is chosen by Pj and sent
encrypted to Pi.
2) Pi generates a pseudorandom nonce, r, which is sent
in response to Pj . Pi stores both sid and r as an
authentication transaction in progress.
3) Pj generates σ, a ring signature of r using its own
private key and the set of public keys in TT ij .
4) Pj sends to Pi the values sid and σ, which includes
both the signature algorithm result and the related the
set of public keys, PKTT ji .
5) Pi uses sid to identify the transaction, retrieves r and
checks the signature’s correctness.
Fig. 2. Peer group membership authentication protocol
If ring − verify validates, Pi checks the validity TT ij ,
as it will be shortly explained. In case that TT ij is valid,
Pj’s peer group membership is considered proved to Pi. Short
term access as a group member is granted using EPKi(sid)
in any further messages. During this access, interactions are
linked via sid (but the identity of Pj is never disclosed).
However, Pj may reset the identifier by re-authenticating. Any
authentication attempt remains unlinked to the previous ones.
In order to check the validity of a trust tree TT ij , for any
certificate from some peer Pk ∈ TT ij , the trust path from Pi to
Pk must exist. The TT validation process is considered valid
if all trust paths between Certi and any other certificates are
valid, which means that any subject within the TT is a peer
group member. During this validation process, Pi stores in
a local cache correct trust paths. Just certificate subjects are
stored, not the whole certificate. This cache can be used in
further TT validations in order to speed up the process by first
looking up if a trust relationship between Pi and some other
peer has already been checked in previous TT validations.
And advantage of keeping this cache is the fact that it can
be used in the validation process of any TT within the peer
group.
In this proposal, each possible signer for a given TT (each
certificate subject within the TT ) becomes the anonymity
set [27] for each authentication attempt. The signer’s identity
becomes hidden within all subjects in the TT , however, since
during the validation process it has been guaranteed that all
subjects within the TT are group members, it can also be
guaranteed that the signer is a group member.
A TT is used instead of a simple trust path in order to both
dynamically expand the cardinality of the anonymity set and
avoid clearly pinpointing the actual signer (which is usually the
owner of the edge certificate). Using a standard trust path as a
ring signature signer set is not desirable since its cardinality,
once established, will usually remain static. Since the degree
of unlinkability relies on the number of possible signers, in
some instances, such cardinality may become too narrow to
be considered acceptable. TT ’s take advantage of some other
peer’s long trust paths in order to increase the cardinality of
the signer set. Furthermore, at each authentication attempt
between Pi and Pj , the later is not bound to always using
exactly the same TT . Pj is able to generate different TT ’s
which are considered valid, resulting in diverse anonymity sets
which may be used at authentication attempts.
Even in the worst case scenario where Pi directly trusts
Pj , an acceptable TT may still be produced. It is enough to
include some other peers which conform trust paths from A,
even though B does not appear in those paths, as shown in
figure 3 as an example. Even in this scenario it is still possible
to chose which is the cardinality of the anonymity set, up to
the full peer group’s cardinality.
B. Trust tree generation
A TT cannot be generated by arbitrarily collecting and
setting together member public keys, which is the assumption
in a basic ring signature approach, since it must be ensured
that all the included public keys conform some trust path from
Fig. 3. Possible TT ij where Pi directly trusts Pj
the authenticating peer. No unconnected certificate may be
included.
There are several methods to obtain the necessary certifi-
cates in order to generate a TT by taking advantage of a web-
of-trust based peer group membership operation. However, it
is highly desirable that certificate retrieval is performed along
standard network operation, since the impact of using TT ”s
on network performance is minimized, and most important,
other peers then cannot know whether certificate retrieval is
being requested in order to compose TT ’s or just in order to
routinely operate.
Feasible methods for some peer Pj to retrieve certificates
from other group members, other than just directly requesting
them, are:
• Whenever Pi is requested a certificate by someone in-
terested in becoming group member, acting as a patron
following the approach in [17]. The generated certificate
may be stored for later use for TT creation. An advantage
of this option is that all certificates will be useful for
TT generation, since all of them conform a valid trust
path from Pj . Using this method is also an incentive to
become a patron, since the most certificates Pj generates,
the easier it is for him to generate large anonymity sets.
• In web-of-trust environments, peers already know its
patron’s certificates.
• In onion routing anonymous networks, which are the most
popular ones, the sender establishes the message path
by retrieving the certificate of each peer in the desired
path. This is necessary to create each message encryption
layer.That means that some method to directly retrieve
other peer’s certificates must exist. An advantage of this
method is that both onion routing operation and TT
generation make use of the same information.
The proposal in [17], in fact, defines a protocol which
specifically looks up trust paths within the peer group and
is able to retrieve the certificates of other group members.
This capability allows to retrieve any certificate within the
peer group and easily join trust paths in order to create TT ’s.
As shown at the beginning of the authentication process in
subsection IV-A, TT ’s may be generated in advance. It does
not need to be created at the precise moment before initiating
authentication. Peers may slowly generate a large TT as they
operate within the peer group and learn about new certificates.
Different subsets from a large TT , which could amount to the
whole peer group in the best case scenario, may be used at
each authentication attempt, as shown in figure 4. There are
two main reasons for not using the whole information and just
using subsets: avoiding sending large TT ’s across the network,
which may impact performance and slow TT validation, and
preserving the security of the scheme, as will be explained in
section IV-C.
Fig. 4. Using a large TT to generate smaller TT ’s
C. Security analysis
In this section attacks on anonymity are analyzed. This
analysis will focus only on the authentication process, since an
anonymous transport method is assumed, as stated in section I.
For that reason, all strengths and weaknesses of the anonymous
networks will be inherited. Common attacks in anonymous
networks such as the predecessor attack [28], for example,
are not discussed, being completely concerned with message
relay.
• Trusted tree reuse: A big concern in this proposal is the
reuse of TT ’s. If the same TT is always used, it will
ultimately become like an identifier and it will be trivial
to link different sessions. For that reason, the same TT
should not be reused in different sessions. This problem
is solved with the generation of a bigger TT and then
only using smaller subsets.
However, the proposed scheme still minimizes this attack
to some degree, since it cannot be guaranteed that the
same trusted tree, received several times by the authenti-
cating peer at different group membership authentication
attempts, was sent from the exact same peer. Two peers
may generate the same TT , and still follow the properties
listed in section IV, since a given TT may be used by
any peer whose public key is contained in such TT .
• Timing attack: In a timing attack, an authenticating peer
may try to link different sessions by comparing response
timings in the authentication process (message round trip
time). Although anonymous networks already take this
attack into account, this problem can also be solved by
purposely delaying responses a random amount of time
in the authentication protocol.
• Intersection attack: This attack is complementary to that
of TT reuse. The authenticating peer may try to compare
different TT ’s used by the same peer, intersect all of
them, trying to decrease the number of suspects. An
underlying anonymous network does constrain this attack
only to the authenticating peer (it cannot be attempted by
a middle point peer). However, this attack is countered
since it is not possible for an attacker to know which
TT ’s come from the same peer in order to compare
them. All authentication attempts (as well as sessions)
are completely independent and no information is sent
along each one in order to relate different attempts to
each other. Given a set of different TT ’s in which an
specific public key appears in all of them, it cannot be
guaranteed that some of them came from the same peer.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
A method to maintain unlinkability between authentication
attempts in peer groups based on web-of-trust has been
presented. This is achieved by using ring signatures and
introducing the concept of trust trees as the means order to
transport public keys as well as providing an anonymity set
for the signer, which may be constructed according to its own
needs and may be increased or changed over time.
The main contribution of this proposal is the capability of
each individual peer to chose its trust anchors into the peer
group, instead of being forced to use a specific one (such
as a CA or group manager). We consider that this freedom
of choice is extremely important in an environment where
privacy is highly valued. Furthermore, it is faithful to a pure
P2P approach, relying on peer autonomy and self-organization.
Furthermore, the proposed method also nicely meshes into
peer group operation in web-of-trust based scenarios in two
different ways. First of all, trust tree generation does not
force the use of additional protocols, taking advantage of
standard data exchanges in order to retrieve public keys. This
fact improves its performance and minimizes threats from a
passive attacker. Second, the link between trust tree size and
the anonymity set directly rewards those peers who decide to
act as patrons within the group, providing an incentive peers
which act as such. In fact, in a web-of-trust based environment,
it is very important that as many peers as possible agree to
act as patrons.
Currently, research is at its initial stages, the anonymous
authentication model being just set. Further work includes
implementing the model in order to assess its behaviour and
performance under a real group based P2P middleware. A
good candidate for this is JXTA [14].
REFERENCES
[1] Wiley B. Clarke I., Sandberg O. and T.W. Hong, “Freenet: A distributed
anonymous information storage and retrieval system.”, Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, p. 46, 2002.
[2] Freedman M.J. Dingledine R. and D. Molnar, “The free haven project:
Distributed anonymous storage service.”, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, p. 67, 2001.
[3] Mathewson N. Dingledine R. and Syverson P., “Tor: The second
generation onion router”, Proceeding of the 13th USENIX Security
Symposium, August 2004.
[4] X. Ren-Yi, “Survey on anonymity in unstructured peer-to-peer systems”,
Journal of Computer Science and Technology, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 660–
671, July 2008.
[5] Tauman Y. Rivest R.L., Shamir A., “How to leak a secret”, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2248, 2001.
[6] Harn L. Ren J., “Generalized ring signatures”, 2001.
[7] S. Garfinkel, Pgp: Pretty good privacy., O’Reilly and Associates Inc.,
1994.
[8] IEEE, “Standard specifications for wireless local area networks.”, 1999,
http://standards.ieee.org/wireless.
[9] J. Katz, R. Ostrovsky, and M. Yung, “Efficient password-authenticated
key exchange using human-memorable passwords.”, Advances in
Cryptology- EUROCRYPT ’2001, pp. 475–494, 2001.
[10] J. Luo, J.P. Hubaux, and P.Th. Eugster, “Dictate: Distributed certification
authority with probabilistic freshness for ad hoc networks.”, IEEE
Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 2, pp. 311–
323, 2005.
[11] S. Yi and R. Kravets, “Moca: Mobile certificate authority for wireless
ad hoc networks.”, The 2nd Annual PKI Research Workshop (PKI 03),
2003.
[12] L. Zhou and Z.J. Haas, “Securing ad hoc networks.”, IEEE Network
Journal, vol. 13, pp. 24–30, 1999.
[13] J. Kong, P. Zerfos, H. Luo, S. Lu, and L. Zhang, “Providing robust and
ubiquitous security support for mobile ad-hoc networks.”, International
Conference on Network Protocols (ICNP), pp. 251–260, 2001.
[14] Sun Microsystems, “Project JXTA”, 2001, http://www.jxta.org.
[15] A Shamir, “How to share a secret”, Commun. ACM,, vol. 22, pp. 612–
613, 1979.
[16] Joan Arnedo-Moreno and Jordi Herrera-Joancomartı´, “Providing col-
laborative mechanism for peer group access control”, in Proceedings of
the Workshop on Trusted Collaboration. 2006, pp. 1–6, IEEEPress.
[17] Joan Arnedo-Moreno and Jordi Herrera-Joancomartı´, “Collaborative
group membership and access control for jxta”, in COMSWARE’08:
Proceedings of 3rd International Conference on COMmunication System
softWAre and MiddlewaRE. 2008, IEEEPress.
[18] CCITT, “The directory authentication framework. recommendation”,
1988.
[19] Patrick Tsang, Man Ho Au, Apu Kapadia, and Sean Smith, “Black-
listable anonymous credentials: Blocking misbehaving users without
ttps”, in Proceedings of CCS 2007, 2007.
[20] Peter C. Johnson, Apu Kapadia, Patrick P. Tsang, and Sean W. Smith,
“Nymble: Anonymous ip-address blocking”, in Proceedings of the
Seventh Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2007),
2007.
[21] Patrick Tsang and Sean Smith, “Ppaa: Peer-to-peer anonymous authenti-
cation”, Applied Cryptography and Network Security, pp. 55–74, 2008.
[22] Franklin M. Boneh D., “Anonymous authentication with subset queries”,
in ACM CCS 1999, 1999.
[23] Stadler M. Camenisch J., “Efficient group signature systems for large
groups”, in Crypto 1997, 1997.
[24] Persiano G. De Santis A., Di Crescenzo G., “Communication-efficient
anonymous group identification”, in In 5th ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 1998.
[25] Nicolosi A. Dodis Y., Kiayias A. and Shoup V., “Anonymous identifi-
cation in ad hoc groups”, in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT
2004, 2004, vol. 3027, pp. 609–626.
[26] Chaum D. and Van Heyst E., “Group signatures”, Advances in
Cryptology EUROCRYPT 91, vol. volume 547 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science: 257-265, 1991.
[27] Khontopp M. Pfitzamnn A., “Anonymity, unobservability, and
pseudonymity - a proposal for terminology”, in Designing Privacy
Enhancing Technologies: International Workshop on Design Issues in
Anonymity and Unobservability. 2001, pp. 2–9, Springer-Verlag.
[28] Levine B.N. Wright M.K., Adler M. and Shields C., “The predecessor
attack: An analysis of a threat to anonymous communications systems”,
ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur., vol. 7, no. 4, pp. 489–522, 2004.
